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Abstract. Coordination between multiple autonomous agents is a ma-
jor issue for open multi-agent systems. This paper proposes the notion
of Behavioural Implicit Communication (BIC) originally devised in hu-
man and animal societies as a new and critical coordination mechanism
also for artificial agents. BIC is a parasitical form of communication that
exploits both some environmental properties and the agents’ capacity
to interpret their actions. In this paper we abstract from the agents’
architecture to focus on the interaction mediated by the environment.
Observability of the environment – and in particular of agents’ actions –
is crucial for implementing BIC-based form of coordination in artificial
societies. Accordingly in this paper we introduce an abstract model of
environment providing services to enhance observation power of agents,
enabling BIC and other form of observation-based coordination. Also, we
describe a typology of environments and examples of observation based
coordination with and without implicit communication.
1 Introduction
In this paper we advance the notion of Behavioural Implicit Communication
(BIC) as a kind of communication that does not involve specific codified actions
aimed only at communication [1]. We have BIC when usual practical actions
are contextually used as messages for communicating. We argue that providing
agents with an environment enabling BIC eases coordination achievement [2] also
because it can enable a more flexible form of communication between agents.
BIC is a critical coordination mechanism that is mainly responsible for the
overall social order of human societies. A sub-category of BIC, commonly known
as stigmergy [3], is shared also with animal societies, and is widely considered as
a necessary means to achieve coordination without a central control. Stigmergy
has been proposed also as a model of decentralised coordination for Multi-Agent
Systems [4], and it is usually characterised as a form of communication mediated
by the environment which simply needs ant-like agents. BIC is proposed as a
general framework able to provide a more comprehensive theory that covers also
intentional BDI agents.
This paper focuses on the basic properties / services which can be used to
instrument an agent (working) environment so as to support BIC and other
observation-based forms of coordination. In other words we are looking for an
abstract model of environment which could provide a systematic support to BIC,
which could be exploited by MAS for their heterogeneous cooperative activities.
In this paper a formal specification of such a model will be provided, so as to
(i) making unambiguous the description of observation-form of coordination, (ii)
making easier its engineering on top of MAS infrastructure, (iii) enabling form
of automated reasoning on the dynamic behaviour of the MAS exploiting the
services provided by the environment.
Approaches to coordination have been recently classified in two main cate-
gories: subjective and objective coordination [5, 6]. Subjective approaches rely on
the viewpoint of the individual agent that can “perceive” and understand the ac-
tions of its peers. For instance, agents can agree on a coordinated plan thanks to
explicit communication [7] or plan recognition [8, 9]. However, what does it mean
in this approaches that an agent can “perceive” or “observe” another agent? Do
perception and observation always imply a form of communication between the
two agents? On the other hand, objective approaches are mainly concerned with
the viewpoint of an observer that is external to the agents. According to this
interpretation, coordination is instilled in multi-agent systems by means of ad
hoc abstractions, often termed as coordination artifacts [10], that mediate agent
interactions. Coordination artifacts globally affect the behaviour of a multi-agent
system, and are typically provided by agent coordination infrastructures [11, 12]
that shape the environment where agents live and interact.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we sum-
marise what Behavioural Implicit Communication is, and why it is relevant for
coordination in a multi-agent system. Section 3 focuses on the role of the environ-
mental properties that can enable BIC, in particular the capacity of the environ-
ment to affect the observability of agents’ actions: we advance a notion of shared
environment and formalise a first typology. In Section 4 we provide a formal
characterisation for multi-agent systems based on the notion of shared environ-
ment and BIC, and in Section 5 we show its usefulness in modelling properties
of BIC and other scenarios. Section 6 describes how forms of observation-based
coordination can be realised by exploiting the observability features provided
by shared environments. Finally, Section 7 concludes trying to identify a path
toward a future implementation of the shared environment.
2 Behavioural Implicit Communication for Coordination
2.1 Interaction is not always Communication
There is a sense in which the famous claim of the Palo Alto psychotherapy school
“any behaviour is communication” [13] is true: in artificial multi-agent system,
interaction with other agents or with the environment is usually implemented
in terms of a message passing protocol, typically “wrapping” non-agent environ-
mental resources to shape them as agents. Even the only widespread standards
for agent technologies, provided by FIPA, currently account for speech acts only,
neglecting in practice physical acts of any form [14].
However, interaction via messages is not the only viable solution to achieve
coordination. As a more powerful framework, indirect interaction has been pro-
posed [15] as a way to implement stigmergy for MAS societies. Decentralised
coordination would be achieved thanks to interaction via persistent observable
state changes. Indirect interaction is modelled on the pheromone metaphor: to
find the shortest way to reach food ants mark their trail with a pheromone
that is attractive for other ants [16]. However from a functional perspective,
even a pheromone is a message, like one written on a blackboard. Everyone
autonomously accessing the blackboard can read the message and act upon it.
While we will also argue for having persistence and observability of changes
in the agents’ environment as necessary requirements for having global coor-
dination, we strive for a coordination mechanism which does not rely only on
explicit codified communication. In fact not all kinds of communication exploit
codified (and hence rigid) actions. Our claim is that human and animals are
able to communicate also without a predefined conventional language, and this
capacity should be also instilled into artificial agents.
In order to distinguish it from mere interaction, we define communication as a
process where information arriving from agent X (Sender) to agent Y (Receiver)
is aimed at informing Y. X’s behaviour has the goal or the function of informing
Y. X is executing a certain action “in order” to have other agents receiving
a message and updating their beliefs or epistemic state. Communication is an
intentional or functional notion in the sense that it is always goal oriented such
that a behaviour is selected also for its communicative effect.3
While we agree with [17] that coordination can be seen as a causal process of
correlation between agents’ actions always involving an information flow between
an agent and its environment, we do not consider always this flow as a process
of communication. Consider a case where an hostile agent, whose actions are
“observable”, is entering a MAS. If another agent becomes aware of his presence
and can observe him, should we say that the hostile agent is communicating his
position? Or, differently, is the escaping prey communicating to the predator her
movements?
When reasoning about agents we should be at the agents’ level of explana-
tion. There are at least two different viewpoints that need to be disentangled:
3 An agent’s behaviour can be goal oriented for different reasons. An intentional agent
(i.e. a BDI agent) is a goal governed agent (the goal is internally represented) which
instantiates a communicative plan to reach the goal that another agent is informed
about something. However also simple reactive agents (i.e. insect-like) can act pur-
posively (hence can communicate) if their behaviour has been shaped by natural
or artificial selection, by reinforcement learning or by design (in the interest of the
agent itself). In these latter cases the behaviour has the function of communicating
in the sense that it has been selected because of a certain communicative effect.
the agent’s and the designer’s [6]. Relative to the agents’ world, the designer
acts as Natural Selection or God does on our world. Even in the case that an
agent’s perception of the action of another agent is actually implemented as an
information passed from a sender to a receiver, this should not be necessarily
considered as a form of “communication”, and correspondingly the information
passed should not be necessarily labelled as a “message”.
From the external viewpoint of the designer a message passing of this sort
is designed in order to inform the agent who is observing. However from the
viewpoint of the agent a simple perception is not necessarily communication.
2.2 Communication is not always Explicit
Communication is normally conceived as implemented through specialised ac-
tions such as those defined in the FIPA ACL protocol [18]. Such protocols are
inspired by natural language or expressive signals where meaning is associated
to a specific action by convention.
What about the case where the agent is aware of being observed (other
agents believe that he is performing a given practical action) and he “intends
that” [7] the others are interpreting his action? This sort of communication
without a codified action but with a communicative intention is what we intend
for Behavioural Implicit Communication [1]. What is relevant here is that the
agent’s execution plan is aimed to achieve a pragmatic goal as usual: i.e. an
agent A is collecting trash to put it in a bin (as in [8]).
To implicitly communicate, the agent should be able to contextually “use”
(or learn to use or evolve to use) the observed executed plan also as a sign, the
plan is used as a message but it is not shaped, selected, or designed to be a
message.
An agent B has the same goal but observing the other’s action he decides
to clean the other side of the road. Since the agent A knows that an agent B is
observing him, the practical action he is executing can be used also as a message
to B such as “I am cleaning here”. Such a possibility can lead agents to avoid
a specific negotiation process for task allocation and can finally evolve in an
implicit agreement in what to do.
There seems to be at least three different conditions to support such a form
of communication.
– The first is relative to environmental properties. The “observability” of the
practical actions and of their traces is a property of the environment where
agents live. One environment can “enable” the visibility of the others while
another can “constrain” it, in the same way that sunny or foggy days affect
our perception. An environment could also enable an agent to make himself
observable or on the contrary to hide his presence on purpose.
– The second is related to the capacity of agents to understand and interpret
(or to learn an appropriate reaction to) a practical action. A usual prac-
tical action can be a message when an agent knows the way others will
understand his behaviour. The most basic message will be that the agent is
doing the action α. A more sophisticated form would imply the ability to
derive pragmatic inference from it (what is the goal of doing? What can be
implied?).
– The third condition is that the agent should be able to understand (and
observe) the effect that his actions has on the others so that he can be-
gin acting in the usual way also because the other understand it and react
appropriately.
Behavioural Implicit Communication is in this sense a parasitical form of com-
munication that exploits a given level of visibility and the capacity of the others
to categorise or react to his behaviour.
A general definition for BIC is:
the agent (source) is performing a usual practical action α but he also
knows and lets or makes the other agent (addressee) observe and un-
derstand such a behaviour, i.e. to capture some meaning µ from that
“message”, because this is part of his (motivating or non motivating)
goals in performing α.
2.3 BIC is not always Stigmergy
The need for an environment for a multi-agent system is often associated with
the goal of implementing stigmergy as a decentralised coordination mechanism.
Besides, being the production of a certain behaviour as a consequence of the
effects produced in the local environment by previous behaviour or indirect com-
munication through the environment [4], stigmergy seems very similar to the
form of communication we are arguing for.
However these general accepted definitions makes the phenomenon too broad.
It is too broad because it is unable to distinguish between the communication and
the signification processes. As we have seen in Subsection 2.1 we do not want
to consider the hostile agent’s actions or the escaping prey as communicative
actions notwithstanding that the effects of their actions elicit and influence the
actions of other agents. Besides, every form of communication is mediated by the
environment exploiting some environmental channel (i.e. air for audio signals).
As in BIC, real stigmergic communication does not exploit any specialised
communicative action but just usual practical actions (i.e. the nest building
actions). In fact we consider stigmergy as a subcategory of BIC, being commu-
nication via long term traces, physical practical outcomes, useful environment
modifications which preserve their practical end but acquire a communicative
function. In this perspective, stigmergy to a special form of BIC where the ad-
dressee does not perceive the behaviour (during its performance) but perceives
other post-hoc traces and outcomes of it.
Usually stigmergy is advocated as a coordination mechanisms that can achieve
very sophisticated forms of organisation with no need for intelligent behaviour.
However there also exist interesting form of stigmergic communication at the
intentional level. Consider a sergeant who – while crossing a mined field – says
“walk on my prints!” to his soldiers. From that very moment any print is a mere
consequence of a step, plus a stigmergic (descriptive “here I put my foot” and
prescriptive “put your foot here!”) message to the followers.
2.4 Coordination is not always Cooperation
Coordination is that additional part or aspect of the activity of an agent specif-
ically devoted to deal and cope with the dynamic environmental interferences,
either positive or negative, i.e. with opportunities and dangers/obstacles [19].
Coordination can be non social as when an agent coordinate with a moving
object. For instance, it can be unilateral, bilateral and reciprocal (see Fig. 1)
without being cooperative as when a leopard curves left and right and acceler-
ates or decelerates on the basis of the observed path and moves of its escaping
prey; but at the same time the gazelle jumps left or right and accelerates or not
in order to avoid the leopard and on the basis of the observed moves of it. This is
an observation based but not a communication/message based (BIC) reciprocal
coordination.
For the goals of this paper, we distinguish five different forms of coordination:
Unilateral — X intends to coordinate with Y by observing Y ’s actions.
Bilateral — In this case we have the unilateral form of coordination for both
agents, so: X intends to coordinate with Y by observingY ’s actions, and
viceversa: Y intends to coordinate with X by observing X ’s actions.
Unilateral-AW — In this case we have a unilateral form of coordination, but
with a first form of awareness: X intends to coordinate with Y by observing
Y ’s actions, and Y is aware of it (i.e. knows to be observed).
Reciprocal — In this case the we have both a bilateral form of observation
based coordination and awareness by both the agents: X intends to coor-
dinate with Y by observing Y ’s actions, Y is aware of it, Y intends to
coordinate with X by observing X ’s actions and X is aware of it.
Mutual — This case extends the reciprocal form by introducing the explicit
awareness of each other intention to coordinate: X intends to coordinate with
Y by observing Y ’s actions, Y is aware of it, Y intends to coordinate with
X by observing X ’s actions, X is aware of it, X is aware of Y ’s intention to
coordinate, and Y is aware of X ’s intention to coordinate.
Behavioural implicit communication is necessary for mutual coordination while
it is possible and useful in the other kinds of observation-based coordination.
3 Toward a Shared Environment: Objective & Intentional
Observability
The goal of this paper is to instrument an agent working environment with prop-
erties and services that can enable the observation-based forms of coordination
discussed above, BIC in particular. In other words, we aim at defining an ab-









Fig. 1. Forms of coordination in relation to observation capability and awareness.
MAS infrastructure, so as to be exploited by agents living in the MAS to ex-
ploit BIC for their cooperation. Given this objective, it will be fundamental to
identify a formal model of this support, in order to ease its engineering on top
of existing MAS infrastructures: accordingly in this section the abstract model
of the shared environment enabling observability is introduced and in Section 4
its formal semantics is described.
Agents that live in a common environment (c-env) are agents whose actions
and goals interfere (positively or negatively) and need coordination to manage
this interference. In a pure c-env, actions and their traces are state transitions
that can ease or hamper the individual agents’ goals. An example is a ground that
is common for different insects species but where no interspecies communication
is possible. Agents can observe just the state of the environment and act on that
basis without having access to the actions of their peers. Even a trace is seen as
part of the environment and not as a product of other agents. A general property
of a c-env is that it enables agents to modify its state and keep track of it.
We propose a notion of shared environment (s-env), that is a particular case
of a c-env that enables (1) different forms of observability of each other action
executions, as well as (2) awareness of this observability. These features will be
shown to support (unilateral, bilateral, reciprocal, mutual) coordination.
3.1 Observability in Shared Environments
Each s-env is defined by the level of observability that it can afford. The level
of observability is the possibility for each agent to observe, i.e. to be informed
about, another agent’s actions or their traces.
The most general kind of s-env can defined by the fact that each agent
accessing it can observe all the others and is observable by them. A prototypical
model of this sort of environment is the central ‘square’ of a town.
The level of observability of an s-env is formalised by a relation Pow : A ×
A×Act, where A is the set of agents and Act is the set of usual practical actions.
When 〈x, y, α〉 ∈ Pow , also written Pow(x, y, α), it means that action α ∈ Act
executed by agent y is observable by agent x. In this case x has the role of
observer agent and y that of observed agent. This means that in that s-env, it
is possible for x to observe the actions of y. More generally, Pow(x,B, α) holds
for the set B ⊆ A of agents which x has the power to observe through action
α, and similarly, Pow(B, y, α) holds for the set B ⊆ A of agents that have the
power to observe executions of α by agent y.
Pow relation can be then conceived as rules that define the set of ‘opportunity
and constraints’ that afford and shape agents’ observability within the environ-
ment. A specific rule is an opportunity or a constraint for a specific agent and
in particular it is only relative to the agent’s active goals while interacting with
that environment.
A public s-env transfers to an agent a specific observation power : the power
to be informed about others’ actions. So, as the relation Pow is introduced to
statically describe the set of opportunities and constraints related to agents’ ob-
servability, a relation Obs (a subset of Pow) has to be introduced to characterise
the state of the s-env at a given time, so that Obs(x, y, α) means that agent x is
actually observing executions of action α by agent y. That is, Obs(x, y, α) means
that an execution of action α by agent y will be perceived by x.
To take into account the agent’s viewpoint over observation, we introduce
the concept of agent epistemic state (ES), representing the beliefs the agent has
because of his observation role. The ES of an agent x includes its environmental
knowledge which is then given by information (i) on the agents he is observing,
(ii) on the agents that are observing him, and (iii) on the action executions that
he is observing. We generalise, and write Bzobs(x, y, α) for agent z believing
that x is observing executions of action α by z, and Bxdone(y, α) for x believing
that y has executed action α.
3.2 Observation is Interaction with the Environment via Epistemic
Actions
The epistemic state of an agent evolves through epistemic actions, which are ac-
tions aimed at acquiring knowledge from the environment [20]. In our framework
epistemic actions are formalised as a class of interactions with the environment.
Typically, an epistemic action is fired by an agent intention, by which the s-env
reacts updating the epistemic state of the agent. To model agent’s intention,
we introduce the concept of motivational state: besides the epistemic state, an
agent is characterised by a motivational state (MS).
A first case of epistemic action is used by the agent which is willing to know
whether he is observing another agent, whether another agent is observing him,
or generally, whether an agent x is observing an agent y. So, suppose the MS of
z includes intention Izcheck(x, y, α), which means that agent z intends to know
whether x observes executions of α by y. At a given time, an epistemic action
is executed by which the ES of agent z will include the belief about whether
Obs(x, y, α) holds or not.
Similarly, an agent may have the intention Ixobs(x, y, α) in exploiting the
observability power of the environment to observe y’s actions α. The inten-
tion activates the observation service provided by the s-env, causing: (i) the
Bxobs(x, y, α) knowledge to be added to agent’s epistemic state (i.e. agent x
knows that he is observing actions by agent y); (ii) the element Obs(x, y, α) to
be added to the set defining Obs relation (meaning that the s-env enables the
observation for agent x of actions α executed by agent y) In other words, we can
think that the appearance of an intention in the motivation state of the agent
causes the execution of an epistemic action toward the environment, enabling
agent observations.
Similarly, an agent may want to stop observing actions. When the intention
Ixdrop(x, y, α) appears in the agent motivational state, the effects of obs(x, y, α)
are reversed, i.e. no longer the agent continues to observe action α in the future.
Now we are ready to link the MS state of the agent, Obs rules and the ES
state of the agent: according to the semantics of the actions, the execution of an
action α by agent y (denoted as done(y, α)) causes the creation of a new belief
Bxdone(y, α) in the epistemic state of all the agents x of the environment such
that Obs(x, y, α) holds.
4 Formal Model
In the following, we provide a syntax and an operational semantics for modelling
MAS according to the conceptual framework defined in previous sections. This
formalisation has the primary goal of been a precise description of the concepts
described in previous section, and of their impact on the dynamic evolution of
a MAS. Then, given the operational character of the model, it can be used as
an abstract reference implementation for an infrastructure supporting s-envs, as
well as to pave the way towards the application of some analysis tool.
We let metavariables x, y, z range over agent identifiers, and α, β over usual
practical actions.
The syntax of MAS configurations is as follows:
S ::= 0 | A | E | S ||S MAS Configuration
A ::= 0 Agent Configuration
| Bxφ Belief of x
| Ixφ Intention of x
| A ||A Composition
E ::= 0 Environment Configuration
| Pow(x, y, α) x has the power to observe y’s α
| Obs(x, y, α) x is observing y’s α
| E ||E Composition
φ ::= Formulas
obs(x, y, α) x is observing y’s α
| coord(x, y, α) x coordinates with y through α
| check(x, y, α) check whether x is observing y’s α
| drop(x, y, α) prevent x from observing y’s α
| done(x, α) x executes actions α
| ¬φ | Ixφ | Bxφ Structured formulas
The operator for parallel composition is assumed to be commutative, associative,
and to absorb the empty configuration 0.
The metavariable S ranges over configurations of the MAS, which at our
abstraction level are a parallel composition of agent configurations and envi-
ronment configurations. Environment configurations are parallel composition of
terms, each denoting either the power of agent x to observe action α executed by
agent y (Pow(x, y, α)), or the fact that the environment is currently supporting
the fact that x is observing action α executed by agent y (Obs(x, y, α)). Agent
configurations are parallel compositions of mental properties, namely beliefs (B)
and intentions (I) qualified by the agent x, and about a formula φ. Notice that
we model a MAS configuration as a multiset of either agent and environment
properties, without a separation, by simply following the abstraction process
induced by the formalism adopted.
A formula φ can be believed and/or intended by an agent. Atomic formulas
are: (i) obs(x, y, α), used to express that x is observing executions of α by y,
(ii) coord(x, y, α), used to express that x coordinates its behaviour with y by
observing executions of α, (iii) check(x, y, α), used to check if x is observing
executions of α by y, (iv) drop(x, y, α), used to prevent x from observing exe-
cutions of α by y, and (v) done(x, α), used to express an that x executes/has
executed α. Moreover, formulas can be structured ones: ¬φ expresses negation
of φ, Ixφ and Bxφ that agent x intends/believe φ, respectively. A number of as-
sumptions on such formulas are clearly to be made as usual, e.g. that ¬¬φ ≡ φ or
Bxφ ≡ BxBxφ, but we abstract away from this aspect for it plays no significant
role in this paper.
The operational semantics is defined by the following rewrite rules for system
configurations.
−
Izcheck(x, y, α) ||Obs(x, y, α) ||S → Bzobs(x, y, α) ||Obs(x, y, α) ||S [CHK]
Obs(x, y, α) /∈ S
Izcheck(x, y, α) ||S → Bzobs(x, y, α) ||S [NCHK]
−
Izdrop(x, y, α) ||Bzobs(x, y, α) ||Obs(x, y, α) ||S → Bz¬Obs(x, y, α) ||S [YDRP]
Obs(x, y, α) /∈ S
Izdrop(x, y, α) ||Bzobs(x, y, α) ||S → Bz¬obs(x, y, α) ||S [NDRP]
−
Izobs(x, y, α) ||Pow(x, y, α) ||S → Bzobs(x, y, α) ||Pow(x, y, α) ||Obs(x, y, α) ||S [ASK]
Ixdone(x, α) ||S → Ixdone(x, α) ||S′
Ixdone(x, α) ||Obs(y, x, α) ||S → Ixdone(x, α) ||Obs(y, x, α) ||Bydone(x, α) ||S′ [OBS1]
Obs(y, x, α) /∈ S
Ixdone(x, α) ||S → Bxdone(x, α) ||S [OBS2]
−
A ||S → A′ ||S [AG]
Rule [CHK] says that if agent z intends to check/know if x is observing y’s action
α and this is the case, then such an intention will be turned into a belief. Dually,
rule [NCHK] deals with the case where this is not the case (Obs(x, y, α) does not
occur in the system configuration), so that z will believe that obs(x, y, α) does
not hold.
Rule [YDRP] says that if agent z know that x is observing y’s action α
(which is the case) and wants to stop him, term Obs(x, y, α) is dropped from
the environment and z’s belief is updated correspondingly. By rule [NDRP] we
deal where the similar case, but supposing the agent had a wrong belief (x was
not actually observing y’s actions α), which is dealt with trivially.
Rule [ASK] is about agent z willing that x observes y’s actions α: if this is
allowed (Pow(x, y, α)), x’s beliefs will be updated as well as the environment
state.
Rule [OBS1] and [OBS2] recursively define how the environment broadcasts
information about an action to all the observers. When agent x wants to ex-
ecute α, each observer y (rule [OBS1]) will be recursively added the belief
Bydone(x, α): when none needs to be managed, x intention can simply become
a fact, that is, he will belief the action to be executed.
The final, trivial rule [AG] is used to represent the fact that at any given time
some agent configuration can change autonomously, thus modelling any belief
revision or intention scheduling.
Notice that formulas Bzcoord(x, y, α) or Izcoord(x, y, α) never appear in this
semantics. This is because the fact that an agent coordinates its behaviour with
another is not an aspect influencing/influenced by the environment: it is rather
a mental property characterising the forms of observation-based coordination an
agent participates to thanks to the s-env support.
5 Applications of the model
The formal model described above serves multiple purposes:
– clearly and rigorously identifying basic primitives / general-purpose mecha-
nisms which can be composed to specify various type of observation-based
coordination patterns;
– helping the engineering of the approach on top of MAS infrastructures. The
operational semantics provides a rigorous description of the observation fea-
tures we aim at supporting at the infrastructure level. So it is a fundamental
guide for designer and developers of MAS infrastructures which want to
support BIC;
– supporting agent reasoning. By formally defining the observability rules char-
acterising environment configuration, we promote their inspection and for-
mal reasoning by intelligent agents, so as to automate the analysis of the
dynamic behaviour of the MAS: recognising failures, providing suggestions,
and so on.
A formal semantics makes it possible to establish some rigorous properties about
observed events and observation rules of the environment, which necessarily
impact on the reasoning process of observing / observed agents. In other words,
the environment (infrastructure) provides some guarantees which can be taken
as assumptions by agents exploiting the services, so as to alleviate their reasoning
process: for instance, the environment can guarantee agents to observe all the
actions executed by a certain other agent in the right order.
In this section we deepen this issue showing how concepts and applications
related to the s-env notion can be formally addressed by our model.
5.1 Specifying Observation-based Coordination
The formal framework can be adopted to specify rigorously the forms of coor-
dination devised in Section 2. Given two agents x and y, an action α, and the
system configuration S we introduce the following predicates:
– Unilateral
Uni(x, y, α, S) , Ixcoord(x, y, α) ∈ S ∧ Obs(x, y, α) ∈ S
– Unilateral with Awareness
UniAW (x, y, α, S) , Uni(x, y, α, S) ∧ Byobs(x, y, α) ∈ S
– Bilateral
Bi(x, y, α, S) , Uni(x, y, α, S) ∧ Uni(y, x, α, S)
– Reciprocal
Rec(x, y, α, S) , UniAW (x, y, α, S) ∧ UniAW (y, x, α, S)
– Mutual
Mut(x, y, α, S) , Rec(x, y, α, S) ∧ BxIycoord(y, x, α) ∧ ByIxcoord(x, y, α)
So forms of unilateral coordination are obtained by instrumenting the environ-
ment configuration with the simple rule Pow(x , y , α) and with agent x manifest-
ing the intention Ix(obs(x, y, α)), causing the instrumentation of the environment
with the rule Obs(x, y, α).
Bilateral coordination can be obtained by extending previous approach to
include also y observation of x’s actions, instrumenting the environment with
the rules Pow(y, x, α) and Obs(y, x, α), the latter instantiated by the intention
of the agent y Iyobs(y, x, α).
The unilateral and bilateral forms of coordination can be extended then with
forms of awareness, by agents intention Iycheck(x, y, α) enabling y awareness of
the observability of his actions to x – obtaining the unilateral-aw form – and
Ixcheck(y, x, α), enabling also x awareness of the observability of his actions to
y – obtaining the reciprocal form of coordination.
5.2 From Overhearing to Oversensing
As an example scenario possibly enjoying the features of s-envs we consider
overhearing. This has been introduced in MAS as a technique / architecture to
realise forms of collaboration and coordination non-preplanned, typically in un-
structured and unpredictable environments, based on unobstrusive observation
and unsolicited suggestion [21]. Roughly speaking, overhearing consists in one
agent – the overhearer – sniffing messages exchanged by two or more agents. The
overhearer collects the messages and makes them available to suggester agents
through a sort of publish / subscribe service: suggesters subscribe their interest
to be notified by the overhearer when a certain type of event occurs concerning
the communication among observed agents.
Overhearing has been used for supporting group formation in open environ-
ments [22], monitoring the interactive behaviour of organization – in particular
implicit organisation [23], to enable awareness among agents [24], plan and con-
versation dynamic recognition [25].
Overhearing can be suitably implemented on top of the abstract model of
environment described in this paper. In our case the overhearer agent disap-
pears, since its functionalities are directly provided by the s-env environment
(infrastructure), which is responsible to enable interactions (communications)
among agents. The publish / subscribe service among the overhearer agent and
suggester agents is mapped onto the s-env services.
Each suggester agent manifests its intention to overhear certain communi-





Specific examples can be:
Isobs(s, customer, ask(customer, service provider, price(X,Y )))
Isobs(s, service provider, inform(service provider, , ))
Here, all the requests made by the customer agent to a service provider about
some good prices are observed, along with all the information provided by the
service-provider. Actually, our model supports an extension of overhearing to-
ward oversensing, i.e. applying the principle of overhearing to a general model
of action / interaction, which includes – but is not limited to – communication.
6 Other Examples of BIC Coordination
Mutual coordination is at the basis of BIC, requiring not only observation based
coordination and forms of awareness, but agents awareness of each other inten-
tion to coordinate.
Actually, tacit messages can be exchanged also in different other forms of
coordination. In coordination the most important message conveyed by BIC is
not the fact that I intend to do (and keep my personal or social commitments
– which is crucial in cooperation), or my reasons and motives for acting, or the
fact that I’m able and skilled. It is more relevant communicating (informing)
about when, how, where I’m doing my act/part in the shared environment, so
that you can coordinate with my behaviour while knowing time, location, shape,
etc.
In what follows some examples of coordination with tacit messages are pro-
vided that are inspired mainly from the teamwork literature.
6.1 Information on the other members’ activity: “I am ready”.
In [7] a trade off in the amount of information team members must maintain
on each other intentions is discussed, particularly when a step involves only an
individual or a sub-team. This intention tracking does not need a complete plan
recognition but simply that the individual or the sub-team intend to execute
that step. Consider as an example a sort of teamwork which is to drive an
underground train. A coordination problem for the driver is to close the doors
when all passengers are on board and this can be difficult when a station is
overloaded. The driver is able to observe using a mirror the passengers rush in
taking his train. Passengers usually don’t know to be observed and they are not
communicating their intentions. However usually before leaving a station the
drivers make a first attempt to close the door which, although it is a practical
action, is mainly used as a message like “The train is leaving”. The driver does
not intend to really close the door. However whether passengers understand the
message or simply infer the driver’s intention to leave, they often go off the train
and let the train leave safely the station. This is a case of bilateral coordination
where only the drivers’ actions can be considered as messages.
6.2 Joint persistent goals achievement: “I have done it”.
Joint intention theory [7, 26, 27] has been proposed as a framework for multi-
agent coordination in a team. The team members are required to jointly commit
to a joint persistent goal G. It also requires that when any team member acquires
the belief that G has been achieved or turns out to be unachievable or irrelevant,
a mutual belief about this event should be attained. Because of the domain is
usually of partial observability, the team member is commonly designed to sig-
nal this fact to the other agent through explicit communication. However, in real
world domains, explicit communication has a cost and sometimes the expected
cost of mis-coordination can outweigh it [28]. Behavioural implicit communica-
tion can be adopted in such cases even if it is possibly ambiguous because it can
turn out to be good enough and better of not communicating at all. Drawing on
[28] consider such scenario. Two helicopters with different abilities have a joint
goal of reaching together a final destination but encounter a dangerous radar
unit. Only one of them is capable of destroying the radar and should decide to
communicate a message like “I destroyed the radar” to the other. However send-
ing these message could be too expensive and risky (i.e. by being intercepted). If
the destroyer believes that the other helicopter is following him and is observing
him, by simply keeping on track to destination he can assume that the other
will receive his silent message anyway and will keep the commitment to reach
the final destination. This is a case of mutual coordination with tacit messages
because also the follower’s action of keeping the track can be considered as a
message.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a model of a shared environment for observa-
tion based coordination which can enable behavioural implicit communication
between the agents. The BIC approach and the related shared environment sup-
porting framework can be suitably implemented in infrastructures supporting
the MAS. In particular governing infrastructures – i.e. infrastructures providing
abstractions and services also for governing / constraining agent interaction [6]
– can be suitably adopted for the purpose, representing the s-env as a first class
issue.
The requirement for a MAS infrastructure in order to support the
observation-based coordination are:
– It must provide explicit abstractions storing, managing and enacting pow
and obs rules, as the set of rules defining respectively the observability level
of the environment and the set of rules defining actually what observations
are taking place;
– It must have access to the motivational state of the agents, in order to
dynamically check for agent intentions, causing epistemic actions and then
the updating of the obs rules of the environment;
– It must have access to the epistemic state of the agents, in order to dy-
namically update it according the action execution events and the obs rules
dynamically characterising the shared environment.
The concept of observation artifact is strictly related to the coordination artifact
abstraction [10], which represents first class runtime entities provided to agents
to support their coordination. TuCSoN is a coordination infrastructure for MAS
supporting the coordination artifact abstraction [11]: accordingly suitable infras-
tructure can be devised to support effectively observation artifacts, as runtime
entities enhancing the observation capabilities of agents.
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